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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

PETER A. PETERSON,

10900

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant was charged with the crime of assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm. He
was convicted of the crime on January 13, 1967, in the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. This is an
appeal from that conviction.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried in the lower court subsequent
to a plea of not guilty to a charge of assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to do bodily harm.Upon a trial by jury
he was found guilty and convicted of the crime as charged
and sentenced to the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON A!PPEAL
The respondent seeks affirmation of the lower court's
judgment and appeUant's conviction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent is in general agreement with the statement O'f facts as contained in the appellant''S brief with the
following exceptions, additions and alterations:
That while Miss Skelton testified that Mr. Magnuson tried to choke her (Tr. 44), Mr. Magnuson asser't'S that
he only tried to kiss her, at which time "she jumped up
against the wall" (Tr. 15).
1.

2. The cut inflicted on the hand of Mr. Magnuson required six stitches to cloise (Tr. 25).
3. The verdict returned by the jury said nothing about
great bodily harm (R. 24), nor is the degree of harm intended a:s an element of the offense.

ARGUMENT
THE SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS
REQUIRED TO CONVICT FOR THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE CHARGED IS A MATTER TO BE DECIDED
BY THE JURY, AND AN APPELLATE COURT IS
PRECLUDED FROM RE'VERSING A CONVICTION
WHERE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT SO THAT
REASONABLE MINDS ACTING FAIRLY UPON IT
COULD FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BE,YOND
A REASONA BLE DOUBT.
1

3

A. Specific intent is an issue of fact to be determined
by the jury.
One of the elements of the crime for which the appellant was convicted was "that the said assault was done
with the intent to do bodily harm ...." (R. 21).
The appellant's main argument is, in essence, that the
evidence presented at the trial was insufficient as a matter of law to susta:in t'he conviction in that the spedific
intent required to commit the crime was not adequately
shown. Thus, the appellant would have the court believe,
in a round about way, that the determinati'on of intent is
a matter of law as opposed to fact.
In the case of State v. Jensen, 120 U. 531, 236 P.2d 445
(1951), the court said, "The question of intent is practically always one for the jury."
On a number of occasions, California courts have treated this same issue. In People v. Pineda, 41 C.A.2d 100, 106
P.2d 25 (1940), the court held:
Where specific intent is a necessary element of an
offense, the intent is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and, except
where facts proven afford no reasonable ground for
inference as to intent, it i's the province of the jury
to find the intent and to say what particular intent
follows from the •acts done.
Later in People v. Bateman, 175 C.A.2d 69, 345 P.2d 334
(1959), California Courts reiterated their position, "Intent
with which an act is done may be gathered from all cir-
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cumstances shown in the evidence and is a question of fact."
This universality of opinion was also displ'ayed in the
Oklahoma case of Ogelsby v. State, 411 P.2d 974 (Okla.
1966), in which the court declared:
... intent, in a case where specific intent is a necessary element of the offense, is a question of fact for
the jury, to be determined from all the circumstances and beyond a reasonable doubt ....
In helping juries to decide this issue, the very nature
of intent has been of some assistance, and certain presumptions are authorized. In People v. Vogel, 46 C.Zd 798, 299
P.2d 850 (1956), the California Supreme Court said in essence:
An unlawful act proved to have been done by person accused thereof is presumed to have been intended, and burden is on him to prove justification
or excuse overcoming such presumption.
Mr. Justice Crockett, expressing the views of this court
in Uintah Freight Lines\'. Public Service Commission, 119 U.
491, 229 P.2d 675 (1951) said," ... in criminal cases ... a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences O·f his unlawful acts .... "
This view was also voiced in the Washington case of
State v. Leach, 6 Wash.2d 641, 219 P.2d 972 (1950), where
the State Supreme Court held:
Although commission of an overt act does n·ot
establish the particular intent to commit a specific
crime, yet intent, being a state •of mind, may be in-
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£erred by the jury from all the facts and circumstances as is the case in consummated crimes. (Emphasis added.)
From the foregoing, it can be easily ascertained that the
matter of intent is an issue of fact to be determined by the
jury. It is within their province not only to weigh the pertinent evidence but to determine whether such evidence
has in fact indicated the requisite intent. In the instant
case, the jury weighed the evidence presented and appropriately concluded that the appellant had in fact entertained the specific intent to do bodily harm.

B.

Role of appellate court in reviewing criminal con-

victions.
The role of an appellate court in reviewing criminal
convictions has been traditionally restdcted so as to preserve the judicial system generally. The sanctity of the
jury as the trier of fact has been held inviolate, and the
standards of review applied by appellate courts have reflected 'that degree of respect.
1.

Courts will not invade the province of the jury.

In State v. Whitely, 100 U. 14, llO P.2d 337 (1941), this
court through Chief Ju~tice Moffat expressed its Views
vis-a-vis the proper respect to be 'accorded the jury function. It said:
The findings of fact made by a jury or the trial
court sitting as a jury, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and will not be disturbed
on appeal.
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The Californi a Supreme Court ruled similarly in People v. Henderson, 34 C.2d 340, 209 P.2d 785 (1949):
1

Quest'ions of weight of evidence and credibility of
witnesses are for trial court and where circumstances reasonably justify finding of guilt, an opposing
view that they also may be reconciled with innocence will not warrant interference with judgment
on appeal.
A later case decided by the same court wherein a writ
of certiorari was denied resulted in a decision, Which in essence held that it was not the 'function of an appellate
court in a criminal case to reweigh the evidence. People v.
Wein, 50 C.2d 383, 326 P.2d 457 (1958). Th is court in the
case of State v. Hedger, 14 U.2d 197, 381 P.2d 81 (1963) has
more recently treated this very subject:
1

In answer to the appellate's contentions, which go
to the weight of the evidence, we need only reiterate
the oft-stated rule that unless it can be said as a
matter of law that the finder of fact made ·an erroneous decision, this Court will not weigh the evidence.
Two other cases are particularly in poiint with our present case. In People v. Reichenan, 173 C.A.2d 584, 343 P.2d
603 (1959), the court said in essenct that "where each element of an offense is a question of fact for jury, the jury's
determination should not be disturbed on appeal."

In t'he case of Bayne v. State, 72 Oki.Cr. 52, 112 P .Zd
1113 (1941), involving an assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to do bodily harm, the Oklahoma Co urt said
that "a conviction for ass ault with intent to do bodily harm
1

1
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should no't be disturbed, even where the evidence was conflicting."

In the instant case, the jury found sufficient facts to
satisfy each of the elements of the crime, and upon those
conclusions the appellant was convicted. As has been shown,
it is not the prerogative of a reviewing court to interfere
with this jealously guarded jury function.
2.

Standard applied in reviewing convictions.

In consonance with the foregoing display of the rightful function of the jury in a criminal conviction, it is ne1:essary to relate thait function with t'he standards applied by
courts reviewing such convictions. There is an abundance
of Utah law outlining these standards to be applied.
In State v. Sullivan, 6 U.2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957),
in which certiorari was denied, this court held:
Before a verdict may properly be set aside, i't must
appear that evidence was so inconclusive or unsatisfactory th1at reasonable minds acting fairly upon it
must have entertained reasonable doubt that defendan't commi'tted the crime, and unless evidence
compels such conclusion as matter of law, verdict
must stand.

In State v. Ward, 10 U.2d 34, 347 P.2d 865 (1959), this
court further declared:
. . . it is the prerogative of the jury to judge the
credibil'i'ty of the witnesses and to determine th:e
facts; . . . evidence will be reviewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict; and . . . if when so
viewed it appears that the jury, acting fairly and
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reason·ably could find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed.
Even more recent1y, it was Justice Wade, w'hile voicing
the majority opinion in State v. Berchtold, 11 U.2d 208, 357
P.2d 183 (1960) who said:
We reverse a jury verdict only where we conclude
from a consideration of all of the evidence and the
inference therefrom viewed in the light most favorable to such verdict that the findings are unreasonable.
Perhaps the latest expre~sion of this court on the matter
is contained in State v. Canfield, 18 U.2d 292, 442 P.2d 196
(1967). Here Chief Justice Crockett speaking for the court
said:
It is our dulty to respect the prerogative of the jury
as the exclus'ive judges of the credi'bility of the witnesses and as the determiners of the facts. Consequently, we assume that they believed the State's
evidence, and we survey it, together with all fair
inferences, that the jury could reasonably draw
therefrom, in the light most favorable to their verdict.
Needle'ss to say, Utah is not done in applying these
standards. The New Mexico Supreme Court in City of RosWell v. Hall, 45 N.E. 116, 112 P.2d 505 (1941) has said:
We have held in numerous cases that if there is
substantial evidence to support a judgment or sentence in a civil or criminal case that it will no't be
d'isturbed on appeal; and in determining whether
there is substantial evidence we will con~der only
that part of the evidence supporting the judgment,

and reject the opposing or conflicting testimony.
In People v. Ketchel, 59 C.2d 503, 381 P.2d 394 (1963), the
Supreme Court of California expressed, in e'ssence, the following:

An appellate court will search only for substantial
evidence to support conclusion of trier of fact where
sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction is
raised on appeal, and every fact reasonably deducible from the evidence will be assumed in favor of
the judgment.
Thus can be seen the attitude with which the court
must approach this appeal by this appellant. Unless his appeal can withstand t'he rigors of these exacting standards
of review, it must of necessity fail.

CONCLUSION
The resondent submits that there was sufficient evidence whereby the jury, in exercising its proper function as
the trier of fact, could have found as it did that the appellant had the requisite intent to inflict bodily harm. The
respondent further submits t'hat this court is precluded from
disturbing those findings of fact and should affirm the conviction of the appellant as adjudged in the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Assistant Attorney General
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JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capi>t,ol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

